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ANTITRUST ISSUES IN CONGLOMERATE
ACQUISITIONS: TRACKING A
MOVING TARGET
BETrY BOCK*
INTRODUCTION

During the spring and early summer of 1969, the Department of Justice launched a series of five complaints designed to test the application of
the merger act to acquisitions where the acquired company's operations
were not closely aligned with those of the acquiring company. These complaints, addressed to what have been called "conglomerate" acquisitions,
represented a new stage in the campaigns of the Department of Justice and
the Federal Trade Commission to enforce section 7 of the Clayton Act, as
amended in 1950 (the merger act).'
In one sense, these five cases represent a logical development of enforcement agency theory concerning the market effects of horizontal and vertical
mergers, on the one hand, and mergers between close potential competitors
or closely related partners, on the other.
In another sense, the five cases represent something new by way of enforcement agency action, since the allegations do not focus primarily on the
effects of the challenged acquisitions on specific markets. The principal
thrust of the charges is that the scale and pace of merger activity has been
increasing rapidly, that the proportion of the total assets of the nation's
manufacturing corporations held by the 200 largest manufacturing firms
has also increased substantially, and that the bulk of this increase in aggregate concentration has resulted from mergers. The five complaints, therefore, charge, in virtually identical terms, that each of the mergers under
attack will result in an increase in over-all concentration and, therefore,
will substantially lessen competition in violation of Clayton 7.
This paper traces the history of current antitrust concern with conglomerate acquisitions, exploring the economic implications of the Supreme
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Court's decisions concerning such acquisitions in the 1962-1968 period, and
going on to examine the 1969 complaints. The final section of the paper
examines some of the underlying statistical data and explores the economic
trajectory along which present enforcement theory is moving. Before beginning the analysis, however, some initial discussion of the semantics and
the underlying concepts may facilitate an understanding of the problems
involved.
THE SEMANTIC MAZE

Few words that mean so many different things to so many different
observers have remained in general circulation as long as the word conglomerate. Indeed, the term applies today both to a form of corporate organization and to a pattern of acquisition. But since the term has no tight
technical meaning, it does not automatically provide for a clear-cut category
2
of either corporations or mergers.
With some refinements, the concept has remained basically unchanged
since a TNEC report on The Structure of Industry, published in 1941, used
the term to describe acquisitions that were neither horizontal (bringing together competitors) nor vertical (bringing together a supplier-customer pair
of companies). 3
A Basic Paradox
Through the years the word conglomerate has, therefore, represented
a residual category accounting for all acquisitions that are neither directly
horizontal nor directly vertical. With so wide a coverage, however, it is not
surprising that as of late in the 1960s, conglomerate acquisitions appeared
to some to menace the future of the enterprise system while to others they
represented viable instruments of competitive progress.
The present paper finds that this paradox arises only in part from the
looseness of the underlying concept and that even with a more precise concept, the conglomerate method of company growth would present analytic
dilemmas so long as one focuses on essentially structural methods of studying how industries or major segments of the economy are organized.
Focus of the Study
If a diversified company acquires a relatively undiversified partner
whose operations are horizontally or vertically related to some part of its
own operations, the acquisition will be treated as a horizontal or vertical
acquisition by the enforcement agencies and no novel problems concerning
conglomeration as such need arise. 4 But if a company, whether diversified
2 The terms acquisition and merger are used interchangeably in the present study
except where the context clearly requires one or the other.
8W. THORP & F. CROWDER, THE STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRY (TNEC Monograph No. 27,

1941).
4

See, B.

BOCK, MERGERS AND MARKETS:

7 (NICB Studies in Business Economics No.
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or not, acquires another whose operations are not related or are only minimally related to its own, additional problems going well beyond those implicit in horizontal or vertical acquisitions can present themselves. 5 It is to

this last set of problems that this paper is addressed.
The paper is, therefore, concerned not with acquisitions by conglomerate (or diversified) companies, as such, but with acquisitions by any type
of company of other companies, or parts of companies, whose operations
are in general conglomerate to its own.
UNDERLYING COURT DEcIsIONs

Like all of the basic antitrust laws, section 7 of the Clayton Act, as
amended in 1950, is formulated in broad terms and was designed by Congress to prevent acquisitions which might substantially lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly. Congress, however, left it up to the courts
to determine the conditions under which an acquisition would have such
effects. Indeed, the text of the law is virtually bare of specifics:
[N]o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock ...and no corporation subject
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in
commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country,
the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly.e
Theory on Horizontal and Vertical Acquisitions (1962-1963)
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,7 the first of the cases to reach the
Supreme Court under amended Clayton 7, was decided in 1962 and concerned Brown Shoe's acquisition of Kinney, a merger that was simultaneously
horizontal and vertical. Both Brown and Kinney had been manufacturers
and retailers of men's, women's, and children's shoes. The Supreme Court
held against the acquisition and in the process noted that the merger act
applies "not only to mergers between actual competitors, but also to vertical
and conglomerate mergers whose effect may tend to lessen competition in
any line of commerce in any section of the country." s A key point of the
law, said the Court was the authority given to the enforcement agencies to
arrest mergers while their threat to competition was potential rather than
105, 1969); B. BOCK, MERGERS AND MARKETS (NICB Studies in Business Economics No. 100,
6th ed. 1968); id. No. 93 (5th ed. 1966); id. No. 87 (4th ed. 1965); id. No. 85 (3d ed. 1964);
id. No. 77 (2d ed. 1962); id. No. 69 (Ist ed. 1960).
5 See B. BOCK, MERGERS AND MARKETS: 7, 59-90 (NICB Studies in Business Economics

No. 105, 1969); B. BocK, MERGERS AND MARKETS 129-62 (NICB Studies in Business Economics

No. 100, 6th ed. 1968); id. No. 93, at 140-210 (5th ed. 1966); id. No. 87, at 95-107 (4th ed.
1965); id. No. 77, at 124-46 (2d ed. 1962).
6 Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964) (emphasis added).
7 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
s Id. at 317.
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actual. The Court noted further that an analysis of the potential competitive
effects of an acquisition should center on such effects in a product market
(line of commerce) and a geographic market (section of the country).
Under Brown Shoe, the boundaries of the product market are to be
determined by the interchangeability of the relevant products and substitutes for them; and there may also be relevant submarkets within such
markets; while under United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,9 decided in 1963, the boundaries of the geographic market are to be determined by the area within which the relevant product is distributed where
"the effect of the merger on competition will be direct and immediate." 10
A third decision handed down by the Court of Appeals of the District
of Columbia in 1962 also contains language relevant to later decisions con1
the Fedcerning conglomerate acquisitions. In Reynolds Metals v. FTC,"
eral Trade Commission had challenged Reynold's acquisition of Arrow
Brands. Arrow had been the largest of eight small companies producing
florist foil, an aluminum foil wrap for flower pots, and Reynolds was one
of the few companies producing aluminum foil. The court held that the
acquisition might substantially lessen competition. It found that the assimilation of Arrow into Reynolds' enormous capital structure ("deep-pocket")
had given Arrow an advantage over its competitors and that the power of
a rich parent to put its resources into a small-company market gave the
acquired company the opportunity to sell at prices approximating cost or
2
below and to "undercut and ravage the less affluent competition."'
Problems of Conglomerate Acquisitions
With Brown Shoe (1962) and PhiladelphiaBank (1963) behind it, the
Supreme Court had, therefore, as of the beginning of 1964 evolved a set
of basic tests for horizontal and vertical acquisitions - and these tests were
phrased primarily in terms of concentration in the markets affected, the
market shares of the merging companies, the potential barriers to entry that
the acquisitions might effect, and the degree of foreclosure from actual or
potential markets of independents that might result from vertical acquisitions.
By early in 1964, then, the Supreme Court was in a position to focus
on the competitive effects of acquisitions where there were only limited
prior horizontal or vertical relations between the merging companies. Although these acquisitions were conglomerate, as we understand the term
today, they were not identified as such by the Department of Justice or by
the Supreme Court. Instead, the Court married conventional theory conceming horizontal acquisitions to a theory of potentiality to find that each
9 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
10 Id. at 357.
11309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
12 Id. at 229-30.
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of the acquisitions might substantially lessen competition. The theory
evolved in these cases is considered in a subsequent section of this paper.
A second series of decisions, beginning in 1965 and developing through
1968, identified the acquiring-acquired company relationship as conglomerate and married conventional theory concerning horizontal and vertical
acquisitions to the potentiality theory developed in the 1964 decisions and
to a "deep-pocket" theory to again find that a series of challenged acquisitions might substantially lessen competition. The theory evolved here is
likewise considered in a subsequent section of this paper.
But before moving forward to examine these decisions, it may be well
to examine the terminology and its relationship to an analytic understanding of the problems involved.
The acquisitions of today - and particularly conglomerate acquisitions
can be thought of as representing a current stage in the evolution of
economic transactions - starting with barter and moving on through the
purchase and sale of perishables, semi-durables, durables, equipment and
plants, to companies. Indeed, the existence of a market for companies both listed and unlisted- represents the latest dimension of choice available to economic units, since it permits companies to restructure themselves
in order to preserve economic flexibility in a rapidly changing environment.
In 1965 when the Supreme Court first considered an acquisition it
identified as involving a conglomerate relation between the merging partners, it found it useful to classify such acquisition as product-extension,
market-extension, and other or "pure" conglomerate acquisitions. This terminology emphasized the resemblances between that case (FTC v. Procter
& Gamble Co.)1s and conventional horizontal acquisitions, but it appears

today to be less serviceable as additional forms of conglomeration increasingly claim our attention. For the purpose of the present study, therefore, conglomerate acquisitions will be considered in terms of two subcategories to be called "convergent" and "divergent" acquisitions.
Convergent conglomerate acquisitions will include acquisitions where
there is a close community of economic interest between the acquiring and
acquired company in significant parts of the operations of at least one of
them. The term is, therefore, broad enough to include acquisitions involving
product- and market-extension as well as those joining close potential customers or suppliers. It also covers other acquisitions where the acquired
company fits into the operations of the acquiring company in ways that decrease overhead, reduce risks, and/or raise the efficiency of the operations
of either or both companies.
Divergent conglomerate acquisitions will then include all other conglomerate acquisitions, i.e., acquisitions where management services or
financing represent the major ties between the acquiring and acquired companies, and acquisitions entered into for stock market leverage purposes.
13

386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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EXTENSION OF HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL THEORY TO
CONVERGENT CONGLOMERATE AcQuISITIONS

(1964-1968)

During 1964 the Supreme Court was concerned with a series of cases
where there were close but not fully consummated competitive relationships
between the acquiring and acquired companies. In these cases the Court
extended conventional theory concerning horizontal acquisitions (acquisitions of actual competitors) to acquisitions of close potential competitors.
In all but one of these cases, 14 the facts concerning potential competition
were clear-cut and the entry of one company into the other's market had
been imminent prior to the challenged acquisition. But the term "conglomerate" does not appear in these cases. Instead, the criteria for horizontal
acquisitions are stretched to cover closely aligned types of acquisitions.
Following 1964 and moving through 1965-1968, the Supreme Court
dealt with an additional set of cases where the term "conglomerate" was
used, but where the relationship between the acquiring and acquired company was still close and where distribution of overhead costs could result
in a decrease in the unit costs of the acquired company to the detriment
of weaker competitors. It was in these cases that the original interpretations
of the law concerning conglomerate acquisitions, identified by name, first
evolved. Each of these two sets of cases will be considered in turn.
Conglomerate Acquisitions Not Identified as Such
In 1964 the Supreme Court handed down a decision concerning El
acquisiPaso Natural Gas' acquisition of Pacific Northwest Pipeline -an
tion that would later have been called a market-extension acquisition. 15
Prior to the acquisition, El Paso had been the sole out-of-state supplier of
natural gas in California. Pacific Northwest distributed along a pipeline
from New Mexico to the Pacific Northwest, but had no customers in California. Shortly before the acquisition, however, Pacific Northwest had been
negotiating to supply Southern California Edison, the largest industrial user
of natural gas in southern California; a tentative agreement had been
reached when Pacific Northwest was acquired by El Paso. In considering
the competitive consequences of the acquisition, the Supreme Court noted
that the California market for natural gas was expanding and that while
El Paso had been the only existing out-of-state supplier, Pacific Northwest
was a potential supplier, as evidenced by its negotiations with Southern
California Edison. The Court then found that the acquisition might substantially lessen competition, holding that the appropriate criteria included
the nature and extent of the market and the nearness of the absorbed company to it; the eagerness of the absorbed company to enter the market and
its potential ability to do so; and finally, the growth potential of the market and the potential ability of the absorbed company to supply it.
14 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
15 United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
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The second 1964 decision concerned Alcoa's acquisition of Rome Cable
or what today would be considered a vertical and a product-extension
acquisition.1 6 The Court noted that Alcoa is a fully integrated aluminum
producer and also manufactures aluminum conductor, accounting for 27.8
percent of the market in 1958. Rome was primarily a manufacturer of copper conductor, although it had also produced a small amount of aluminum
conductor. The Court held that the acquisition might substantially lessen
competition even though Alcoa did not produce copper conductor and
Rome accounted for only 1.3 percent of the aluminum conductor market.
While the reasoning is not spelled out, the Court appears to have been concerned with the increasing substitutability of aluminum for copper conductor and, therefore, the elimination of potential competition between Alcoa
and Rome; it was also concerned because the acquisition had eliminated a
viable, independent company that might have become a strong competitor
in the aluminum conductor market if it had not been acquired by Alcoa.
The third of the 1964 decisions concerned Continental Can's acquisiacquisition which today would be considtion of Hazel-Atlas Glass -an
ered a horizontal and a product-extension acquisition.' 7 The Department
of Justice had charged that the acquisition of the third largest United States
producer of glass containers by the second largest United States producer
of metal containers might substantially lessen competition in the combined
container market as well as in specific markets where metal and glass are
used interchangeably. The Supreme Court agreed. The basic issue concerned the relevance of actual or potential competition between the two
types of containers to a conclusion about the competitive effects of the acquisition. The Court found that the two lines could under many conditions
be used interchangeably and that, therefore, the acquisition had brought
together potential, if not actual, competitors and thus might substantially
lessen competition.
The fourth decision concerned the establishment of Penn-Olin as a
joint venture by Olin-Mathieson and Pennsalt to operate in the sodium
venture which today would be conchlorate market in the Southeast -a
sidered a product-extension acquisition for Olin-Mathieson and a marketextension for Pennsalt.' 8 In its first decision in that case, the Supreme Court
held that the way to test whether such a venture might substantially lessen
competition was to ask whether absent the venture one of the parent companies might have gone into the market while the other continued on the
periphery as a potential competitor. On remand, the district court found
that although strong recommendations for independent internal expansion
into the southeastern sodium chlorate market had been made by members
of the staff in each parent company, neither management had been willing
to invest on its own and that, therefore, neither had been a potential corn-

-

16 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,

377 U.S. 271 (1964).

United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
18 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
17
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petitor. On appeal, an equally divided Supreme Court left the lower court
decision undisturbed. 19
In summary, then, although the "conglomerate" concept does not appear in direct form in the 1964 decisions, the Supreme Court had in fact
fitted essentially conglomerate problems into an older theoretical mold,
holding that evidence of potential competition between an acquiring and
an acquired company constitutes grounds for finding that an acquisition
may substantially lessen competition when the combined market shares of
the two companies are high, the combined market is concentrated, and barriers to entry are substantial. In these decisions, therefore, the Supreme Court
gave new weight to the concept of potential competition, using it as a magnet to draw facts concerning product- and market-extension acquisitions
within the analytic framework for determining the competitive effects of
horizontal acquisitions.
Conglomerate Acquisitions Identified As Such
Beginning in 1965, however, the Supreme Court began to consider the
competitive effects of acquisitions where the older horizontal molds, even
when expanded by findings on potential competition, would not hold the
conglomerate facts.
The first such decision, FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,20 concerned
Consolidated Foods' acquisition of Gentry. Consolidated Foods was primarily a food wholesaler; Gentry manufactured dehydrated onion and garlic. The record showed that Gentry's sales manager had sought to increase
sales by notifying prospective buyers that Consolidated's purchases from
them would depend on their purchases from Gentry. The Supreme Court
found that the acquisition might substantially lessen competition because
it gave Consolidated the advantage of a reciprocal buying position in competing for business for Gentry. It noted that reciprocal trading may ensue
not from bludgeoning or coercion but from more subtle arrangements such
as a threatened withdrawal of orders if products of an affiliate are not
bought. The Court was careful to note that it had not ruled that every
acquisition which might permit reciprocal sales practices violated Clayton
7; but where the acquiring company commands a substantial share of a
market and there is a clear probability of reciprocal buying, the Commission's findings of probable anticompetitive effects should be honored. 21
In 1967, the Supreme Court went further when it upheld the Commission's finding that Procter & Gamble's acquisition of Clorox might substantially lessen competition. 22 The facts are familiar. Clorox had been the
leading manufacturer of household liquid bleach, with 40 percent of the
19 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 389 U.S. 308 (1967), af'g 246 F. Supp. 917 (D.
Del. 1965).
20380 U.S. 592 (1965).
21 ld. at 600.
22 FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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national market. Its nearest rival accounted for approximately 16 percent
of the market. The industry was highly concentrated, with the first four
firms accounting for almost 80 percent of the market.23 At the time of the
acquisition, Procter & Gamble was not producing household liquid bleach.
It was, however, a major manufacturer of low-priced, high-turnover soaps
and detergents; it was the nation's largest advertiser and was said to receive
substantial cost advantages on its advertising and sales promotion. 24 Prior
to the acquisition, Procter had been diversifying and had considered the
household liquid bleach market. The Supreme Court held that the acquisition had eliminated Procter as a potential independent competitor in
Clorox's market. 25 It also held that anticompetitive effects may result from
the substitution of a powerful firm for a smaller but already dominant firm
in a concentrated industry, since this may substantially raise barriers to
entry and dissuade smaller firms from competing aggressively.
And, in 1968, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to the Third Circuit ruling in General Foods Corp. v. FTC26 that General Foods' acquisition of S.O.S. might substantially lessen competition. General Foods was
a major manufacturer of a diversified line of food products sold through
grocery stores and supermarkets. S.O.S. had been the leading United States
manufacturer of household steel wool pads. Like Procter & Gamble, General Foods had large-scale resources and a substantial advertising and promotion program into which S.O.S.'s advertising and promotion could fit.
ConsolidatedFoods (1965), Procter& Gamble (1967), and General Foods
(1968) taken together indicate that broad-gauge criteria were developing
for judging the competitive consequences of mergers between companies
whose products are not in direct competition but are reciprocally related
or can be distributed through the same outlets. Factors that had made these
acquisitions vulnerable included an acquiring company with substantial
resources; an acquired company with a major position in a concentrated
market; reciprocity sales tactics in the case of Consolidated Foods; and joint
distribution arrangements in the case of Procter & Gamble and General
Foods. In all three cases the economic ties between the acquiring and acquired companies were close and clear and the pressures on third companies
were real and immediate.
Emerging Theory on Convergent Conglomerate Acquisitions
As 1968 drew to a close, the Supreme Court had evolved firm lines of
reasoning concerning the competitive effects of convergent conglomerate
acquisitions but had not considered divergent conglomerate acquisitions,
28
24

Id. at 571.

But see Blank, Tonypandy Once Again, 42 J. Bus. U. CH. 104 (1969); Blank, Television Advertising: The Great Discount Illusion, or Tonypandy Revisited, 41 J. Bus. U.
Cm. 10 (1968).
25 386 U.S. at 580-81.
26

386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied; 391 U.S. 919 (1968).
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nor had either enforcement agency begun to test the merger act along this
vector.
Existing decisions had established broad principles for analyzing situations where the acquiring and acquired companies had close economic ties.
While these principles were based on too few cases to represent a general
theory, their congruence and consequent thrust is strong in cases where:
(1) the acquiring company is one of the largest in the country, (2) the acquiring company's resources loom large by comparison with those of most
third companies in the market it is entering by way of acquisition, (3) this
market is highly concentrated and the market share of the newly combined
firm is substantial, and (4) the acquired company's product-mix is relatively
homogeneous. Latent in all of the decisions, although not referred to as
such, is a "deep-pocket" theory that suggests that the size and resources of
the acquiring company, as evidenced by the market power it can bring
to bear - through its total assets, sales, or advertising expenditures - on
smaller companies in concentrated markets, is of prime signficance to the
27
Court's conclusions.
Task Force Recommendations
Completed as 1968 drew to a close, but not yet published, were two
appraisals of antitrust policy by professional groups: one commissioned by
President Johnson and the other by President Nixon as a presidential candidate. The first was the White House Task Force Report on Antitrust
Policy (the Neal Report), released in May 1969,28 the second, released in
June 1969, was the Report of the Task Force on Productivity and Compe29
tition (the Stigler Report).
The Neal Report adopts a hard line on conglomerate acquisitions and
recommends a new statute to supplement section 7 of the Clayton Act to
prevent large firms from acquiring leading firms in concentrated industries,
and vice versa.
The Stigler Report reaches totally different conclusions concerning conglomerate acquisitions. The Report notes that antitrust has seemed to some
to be a convenient weapon with which to attack large conglomerate mergers
and that if one interprets "elimination of potential competition," "reciprocity," and "foreclosure" as threats to competition, one can always bring
and usually win a case against the merger of any two large companies. But,
the economic threat to competition from reciprocity is either small or nonexistent, since monopoly power in one commodity cannot be effectively used
27 The Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice, issued May 30, 1968, contains
a section on conglomerate mergers; this section represents a general summary of the de4430
cisional law. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES, 1 TRADE REG. REP.
(1968).
28 1968 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST, 115 CONG. REc. 5642 (daily
ed. May 27, 1969).
29 1969 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPETITION, 115
CONG. REC. 6472 (daily ed. June 16, 1969).
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to manipulate the price of an unrelated commodity. And while elimination
of a potential competitor may have anticompetitive effects, a merger will
not have this effect if entry into a field is relatively easy. If entry is difficult,
the independence of the few companies capable of entry should be preserved. But the identity of potential entrants should not be established by
introspection but by evidence.
If the producer of X is truly a likely entrant into the manufacture of Y,
the likelihood will have been revealed and confirmed by entrance into Y
of other producers of X (here and abroad), or by the entrance of the firm
into markets very similar to Y in enumerable respects.30
The Stigler group urges the Department of Justice to resist the natural
temptation to utilize the antitrust laws to combat social problems not related
to the competitive function of markets and expresses doubt as to whether
the Department should undertake an active program of challenging conglomerate enterprises on the basis of nebulous fears of size and economic
power. These fears should either be confirmed or dissipated. To this end,
the Report recommends an early conference of appropriate specialists to
present explicit and specific theories and evidence on the subject. If, says
the Report, there is a genuine securities market problem, new legislation is
probably necessary. Further, if there is a real political threat in giant mergers, then the critical dimensions should be estimated. But "vigorous action
on the basis of our present knowledge is not defensible." 31
As the new administration came to office in 1969, it, therefore, had
inherited strong tools for dealing with convergent conglomerate acquisitions, no tools and no tradition for dealing with divergent conglomerate
acquisitions, and conflicting professional recommendations concerning the
competitive effects of conglomerate acquisitions and what to do about them.
This situation presented several options to the enforcement agencies: they
could confine their actions to attempts to extend existing theory to additional forms of convergent conglomerate acquisitions; they could request
new legislation or studies; or they could attempt to explore the reach of
Clayton 7 along radically new lines.
NEW THEORY ON DIVERGENT CONGLOMERATE
ACQUISITIONS (1969)
As 1969 opened, the Department of Justice elected all three options.
Its activities along the first two lines were traditional in form, but when it
also elected the third option in the spring of the year, it launched a series
of complaints designed to test the applicability of the merger act to divergent conglomerate acquisitions. Five such cases were initiated by the Department in rapid succession and all five were interlinked both in format
82
and in style of allegation.
80 Id.

at 6476.

s lId. (emphasis added).
32 United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969)
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Each begins by noting the horizontal, vertical, and convergent conglomerate relationships between the acquiring and acquired companies and then
goes on to make essentially new allegations concerning potential competition, potential reciprocity, aggregate concentration, and the contribution
of mergers to increases in aggregate concentration.
The Form of the 1969 Complaints Against
Divergent Conglomerate Acquisitions
A complaint issued in May 1969, and addressed to Northwest Industries' attempt to acquire The B. F. Goodrich Company may serve as an
example for analysis - since the charges in that case had been adjudicated
by the time this study was completed early in October 1969.m
The Department of Justice brought suit in May 1969, for a preliminary
injunction to prevent Northwest from carrying out an exchange offer to
the common stockholders of Goodrich, which, if successful, would have
given Northwest more than 50 percent of Goodrich's common stock.
The complaint alleged that Northwest is a holding company and one
of the nation's 130 largest industrial corporations in sales and among the
55 largest in assets. It conducts a diversified business through the sales of
its subsidiaries, running the 4th largest railroad in the nation in trackage
and the 13th largest in operating revenues; it also produces and sells a range
of industrial and consumer products.
Goodrich was, at the time, the nation's 83rd largest industrial corporation in terms of sales. It was a highly diversified company, ranking 4th
among United States tire manufacturers; it also produced and sold a variety
of other industrial and consumer products.
The complaint alleged that Northwest and Goodrich competed in the
manufacture and sale of muriatic acid in the inland waterway area. It also
alleged that each company was likely to enter many of the chemical markets that at the time were served by the other, that these markets were on
the whole highly concentrated, and that the acquisition would eliminate
potential independent competition in these markets.
Up to this point the complaint resembled conventional complaints concerning convergent conglomerate acquisitions. But then the complaint went
on to what were essentially new types of allegations, although similar
charges had also been made in April 1969, concerning LTV's acquisition
of J & L Steel and ITT's acquisition of Canteen Corp. And similar com(Grinnel Corp.) (decided with United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp.) (Hartford
Fire Ins. Co.); United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969);
United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1969 Trade Cas.)
45,069 (N.D. Ill., filed April 28, 1969); United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., Civil
No. 69-438 (W.D. Pa., filed April 14, 1969).
33 United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
On October 21, 1969, the District Court in Connecticut handed down a decision denying a preliminary injunction in the case of ITT's proposed acquisitions of the Hartford
Fire Insurance Company and Grinnell Corporation. These denials were, however, issued
too late for inclusion in the present study. See United States v. International Tel. & Tel.
Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969).
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plaints were brought in August 1969, concerning ITT's proposed acquisitions of Grinnell Corporation and The Hartford Fire Insurance Company.
The United States v. Northwest Industries, Inc.84 complaint alleged that
Northwest and Goodrich had each individually been considering entry into
numerous specified markets and that potential competition between the
companies in these markets might be substantially lessened by the acquisition.
The Northwest complaint also alleged that Goodrich is a major purchaser of transportation services in the area served by Northwest and that
Northwest is a present and potential purchaser of many products manufactured by Goodrich. Both Goodrich's and Northwest's purchasing power
were cited to show that each would be in a position to buy from industrial
companies that are potential customers of the other. The complaint alleged
that these relationships would result in "reciprocity effects" and that a firm's
reciprocity power and its ability to benefit from reciprocity dealing grow
as its purchasing capacity and product diversity increase. The complaint
noted, for example, that Goodrich's sales of tires might be benefited by
Northwest's purchase of railroad equipment and petroleum products from
companies that are significant buyers of tires.
Then the complaint went on to new allegations concerning the relations between aggregate concentration and a substantial lessening of competition in a Clayton 7 sense. It alleged that acquisitions of mining and
manufacturing concerns with assets of more than $10 million have been
rising rapidly, that the total assets involved in such acquisitions have risen
even more rapidly, and that the proportion of the total assets of the nation's
manufacturing corporations held by the 200 largest firins increased from
48.1 percent in 1948 to 54.2 percent in 1960 and to 58.7 percent in 1967
and that the bulk of this increase has resulted from mergers and acquisitions.
In July 1969, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
refused to grant the requested injunction but required that the two corporations be maintained as separate functional entities pending a final court
decision. The court's refusal to grant the injunction was based on its finding that the actual and potential horizontal and vertical relations between
the companies posited by the Department of Justice did not constitute sufficient grounds for a finding of a violation of Clayton 7.
On the issue of aggregate concentration, the court held that whatever
contribution the merger movement might be making to the increased share
of manufacturing assets accounted for by the 200 largest manufacturing
corporations, there was no specific proof that the merger might result in
a substantial lessening of competition or a tendency to monopoly in any
relevant product or geographic market. The court held that it did not read
Clayton 7 to prohibit a merger on the basis of an over-all trend to economic
concentration without a specific demonstration of a substantial lessening
of competition in a specific market.
34

301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. I11. 1969).
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The issue of concentration raises a special question, for the Government is here urging that given a trend to economic concentration, the
consolidation of two of the country's one hundred largest corporations constitutes a violation of Section 7 without any specific demonstration of a
substantial lessening of competition in any section of the country. We do
not so read Section 7.35
Finally, the court noted that whereas there may be good reason to limit
the growth of the largest corporations, particularly through acquisition, the
law as it stands makes adverse effects on competition the test of validity,
and until Congress broadens the criteria, the court must judge proposed
transactions on that standard. 6
As of the early fall of 1969, the Department of Justice had, therefore,
brought five complaints designed to test whether Clayton 7 can be applied
to divergent conglomerate acquisitions. The Federal Trade Commission had
also announced that it was concerned. 7 Both agencies had, therefore, in
effect served notice that they were exploring possible new dimensions for
theory concerning the Clayton 7 consequences of such acquisitions. How
clear-cut are the facts presented in the allegations and what is the trajectory
along which the enforcement process is moving?
Data Questions
What is totally new in the five complaints issued by the Department of
Justice in the months from April through August 1969, concerning divergent
conglomerate acquisitions is a common series of essentially mathematical
allegations. The thrust of the argument is that the scale and pace of merger
activity has been increasing rapidly; that the proportion of the total assets
of the nation's manufacturing corporations held by the 200 largest firms
has also increased substantially; and that the bulk of the increase in aggregate concentration has resulted from mergers.
Id. at 1096.
86 One other lower court decision during the same period, however, resulted in the
grant of a temporary injunction. In that case, Allis-Chalmers had brought suit to prevent
White Consolidated from acquiring it. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed a district court decision refusing the injunction. It found that the merger would
permit the combined company to become the only company in the country capable of
designing, producing, and installing a complete metal rolling mill and that this would
create significant barriers to entry and would permit reciprocal dealing pressures because
85

the major purchasers of rolling mills are steel companies and White Consolidated was a
significant purchaser of steel. The majority adopted the basic reasoning of all of the
Department of Justice complaints and of a projected Federal Trade Commission complaint concerning the link between growing aggregate concentration and the market
power conferred by concentration in individual markets.
The court's findings were taken in large part from a proposed Federal Trade Commission complaint, which was published in March 1969. The Commission announced at
the time that if it could not negotiate a consent arrangement with White to prevent takeover, it would issue the complaint. As of October 1969, the Commission's case had not
surfaced in the form of a complaint or a consent order. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White

Consol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1970).
18,688 (Mar. 6, 1969) (proposed
87 White Consol. Indus., Inc., 3 TR anE REG. REP.
FTC complaint).
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The complaints also allege that as large companies diversify and move
by way of acquisition into more and more markets which they might otherwise have entered by internal growth, they eliminate themselves as independent potential competitors in these markets. At the same time, by moving into wider ranges of markets, they increase their actual and potential
reciprocity relationships with actual and potential customers and suppliers.
In the process, they also discourage other companies from entering these
markets or from growing aggressively there. The facts and inferences taken
together add up to a powerful argument that diversification acquisitions
which take any of the largest industiials into a new market through the
acquisition of any leading company already in the market may substantially
lessen competition or tend to monopoly in violation of Clayton 7.
While it is not possible within any brief scope to examine the data
underlying these propositions in detail, it is possible to raise limited questions concerning the statistical measurements on which they are grounded.
These questions are essentially technical and can be resolved only through
study of the fact-base from which the data are drawn. Since, however, under
our adversary procedures the parties to the cases can be expected to provide attacks on and defenses of the data, discussion of the results of this
process must necessarily await adjudication of the joinder of the factual
and legal issues involved. A few comments on the statistical problems are,
however, in order.
The Arithmetic of Acquisitions
One problem concerns the figures on the number and size of acquisitions. Once its merger notification program is in place, the Federal Trade
Commission may be in a position to compile definitive data for the acquisitions its program covers. At present, however, the data it publishes are
based on acquisitions recorded in Moody's Industrials and Standard &
Poor's. According to these figures, the total of recorded acquisitions of manufacturing and mining units increased from 589 to 2,442 between 1958 and
1968; "large" acquisitions (where the acquired unit had $10 million in assets
or more) increased from 28 to 192 and the assets involved in these "large"
acquisitions increased from approximately $1 billion to approximately $12
billion over the 10 year period.
These figures have led some commentators to suggest that at the present
rate, acquisitions will wipe out a high proportion of, if not all but a
8
small number of, independent companies in some finite period of time.
But these conclusions are drawn from raw data and do not take account
of changes in the company population that forms the matrix for the
88 See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 553-55 (1966) (appendix
to the concurring opinion of Douglas, J.); see also Measuring the Surge of Mergers,
Bus. WEEK, Mar. 23, 1968, at 69, which quotes Senator Philip Hart, chairman of the Senate antitrust subcommittee, as warning that if some action concerning acquisitions is not
taken "some future generation is going to find 10 hands holding all industrial output."
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acquisitions. The available data are not ideal, but some exploratory work by
the Conference Board suggests that the manufacturing and mining
population has been expanding both in number and in total assets at such
taken over through
a rate that the increase in acquisitions and the assets
39
these acquisitions is not having the effects suggested.
Examination of the returns of manufacturing and mining corporations
to the Internal Revenue Service shows, for example, a steady increase in
the number and assets represented by all returns taken together and increases
for all size classes of returns. Since the returns are consolidated to different
degrees, the word return cannot, however, be equated with the word
company or corporation. A related body of statistics on manufacturing
corporations published by the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities
and Exchange Commission does not present sufficient data on the number
of manufacturing corporations so that the number of acquisitions can be
compared with them- but the total assets of acquired manufacturing and
corporations can be compared with the total assets of manufacturing
corporations and while one finds increases in the total assets of the largest
corporations, one also finds increases for all lesser size-classes.40 (See Tables
I, II ,and III)
Aggregate Concentration
For any given year, "aggregate concentration" is a percentage figure
derived from a fraction whose denominator represents total economic activity
in some sector of the economy and whose numerator represents the share of
that activity accounted for by a specified number of companies ranking
highest in that activity.
None of the key words used in this description is, however, selfexplanatory, nor are the data to which they refer self-evident. The 1969
complaints refer specifically to the share of total manufacturing assets
accounted for by the 200 largest manufacturing companies. 41 The figures
appear to come directly from the Studies of the Cabinet Committee on Price
Stability, published in January 1969.42 But since the study tables lack
complete statements showing how the basic data were compiled, it is not
possible to derive the percentage figures independently or to determine with
precision what they mean. Three separate sets of problems are, however,
evident. These concern: (a) methods of determining the level of aggregate
39 Bock, The Arithmetic of Acquisitions, THE CONFERENCE BOARD RECORD, Aug. 1969,
at 24.
40 See id. for the data problems in making these comparisons.
41 Complaint (Grinnell Corp.) at 7-8 & Complaint (Hartford Ins. Co.) at 7, United
States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969); Complaint at
11-15, United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Complaint at 9, United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1969
45,069 (N.D. Ill., filed April 28, 1969); Complaint at 6-8, United States v.
Trade Cas.)
Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., Civil No. 69-438 (W.D. Pa., filed April 14, 1969).
42 STAFF OF COMM. ON PRICE STABILITY, CABINET STUDIES (1969).
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TABLE I
AoQuISITIONS OF MANUFACTURING

AND

MINING

UNITS,

1958-1968

Assets by Size-Class
$10 Million and Over
Total
(All SizeClasses)

Year
1958 ....................
1959 ....................
1960 ....................
1961 ....................
1962 ....................
1963 ....................
1964 ....................
1965 ....................
1966 ....................
1967 ....................
1968P ..................

589
835
844
954
853
861
854
1,008
995
1,496
2,442

1958 ....................
1959 ....................
1960 ....................
1961 ....................
1962 ....................
1963 ....................
1964 ....................
1965 ....................
1966 ....................
1967 ....................
1968P ..................

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

Under
$10 Million

Total Units
Acquired

Number of Acquired Units
551
38
771
64
782
62
895
59
781
72
793
68
763
91
915
93
894
101
1,327
169
2,250
192
Total Assets of Acquired Units
(millions of dollars)
n.a.
$ 1,107
n.a.
1,960
n.a.
1,710
n.a.
2,129
n.a.
2,194
n.a.
2,917
n.a.
2,798
n.a.
3,900
n.a.
4,100
n.a.
8,222
n.a.
12,616

Units
Acquired by
200 Largest
Firms
21
38
35
30
34
46
39
34
33
67
74

$ 638
1,270
1,041
1,728
1,227
2,051
1,815
2,151
2,385
5,417
6,890

SOuRCE: BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FTC, STAT. REP. No. 3, CURRENT TREND IN MERGER
AcrIvrrY, 1968, Tables 2, 5 (1969). Column (2) has been derived by substraction of column
(3) from column (1).

concentration

for a given year,

(b) methods of measuring

changes in

aggregate concentration, and (c) inferences to be drawn from the results.
More specifically, one may, among many possible questions, ask:
(a) First, what is the makeup of the numerator and the denominator of
the fraction from which the aggregate concentration ratio for a given year
is determined? How are the largest companies identified? Does the figure
include corporations only or does it include all forms of business organization? Are the assets figures for individual companies consistent with each
other and do the assets figures in the numerator refer to company operations
consistent with the assets figures in the denominator of the fraction?
For the numerator, or the 200 largest company figure, for example,
how are manufacturing corporations distinguished from other companies?
Are the nonmanufacturing operations of manufacturing corporations in-
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TABLE II
RETURNS OF MANUFACTURING AND MINING CORPORATIONS,

Asset Size-Class

Year

Total A
(All
SizeClasses)

1958 ................
1959 ................
1960 ................
1961 ................
1962 ................
1963 ................
1964 ................
1965 ................
1966P ..............

156,502
163,645
173,956
182,232
192,925
192,475
194,915
194,543
196,621

1958 ................
1959 ................
1960 ................
1961 ................
1962 ................
1963 ................
1964 ................
1965 ................
1966P ..............

$250,898
268,174
279,258
293,908
310,582
327,549
352,913
388,071
429,156

Under
$10
Million

$10
Million
and
Over

1958-1966
Asset Size-Class

$10
Million
to
$50
Million

$50
Million
$100
to
Million
$100
and
Million
Over

Number of Returns
154,224
2,278
1,687
288
303
161,307
2,338
1,711
304
323
171,550
2,406
1,749
322
335
179,790
2,442
1,767
325
350
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
312
369
189,859
2,616
1,894
336
386
192,207
2,708
1,952
333
423
191,714
2,829
2,037
331
461
193,433
3,188
2,293
385
510
Total Assets Reported on Returns
(millions of dollars)
$60,407
$190,491
$34,684 $20,003 $135,804
63,819
204,355
35,703
21,170 147,482
65,284
213,974
36,360
22,441 155,173
67,863
226,045
37,187
22,789 166,069
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
22,070 178,309
73,180
254,369
39,969
23,705 190,695
74,631
278,282
41,296
23,487 213499
79,560
308,511
43,836
23,438 241,237
86,974
342,182
47,740
26,936 267,506

Note: The number of returns and the assets in any given size-class will differ from the
actual figures, depending on the degree to which companies consolidated their returns to
the Internal Revenue Service.
A Excludes returns with zero assets.
P-Preliminary
SOURCES: I.R.S., DEP'T OF TREASURY,

CORPORATION

INCOME TAX RETURNS,

ANNUAL

(1958-1965, prelim. 1966). For 1958, Table V, at 42, 45; 1959 Table IV,
at 68, 71; 1960, Table IV at 63, 66; 1961 Table II, at 43, 52; 1962, Table II, at 60, 66;
1963, Table IV, at 70, 73; 1964, Table VI, at 104, 108; 1965, Table V, at 34-37; 1966,
Table II, at 22.
STATS. OF INCOME

cluded or excluded? Are the manufacturing operations of nonmanufacturing companies included or excluded?
Does the set of the 200 largest corporations include publicly held
corporations only or does it also include privately held corporations (and
if it does, how are assets figures for these corporations obtained)?4
Are data on foreign subsidiaries or affiliates of domestic corporations
43FTC-SEC, QUARTERLY FINANCIAL REPORT FOR MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS (3d
quarter 1969), Table X. Footnotes to the number and kinds of non-registered manufacturing corporations (privately held companies, domestic subsidiaries of Foreign corporations and joint ventures) not listed in The Fortune Directory of the 500 Largest Industrial
Corporations,FORTUNE, May 15, 1969, at 168.
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TABLE III
MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS,

Asset Size-Class

Year

Total
(All
SizeClasses)

Under
$10
Million

$10
Million
and
Over

1958-1968
Asset Size-Class
$10
Million
to
$50
Million

$50
Million
to
$100
Million

$100
Million
and
Over

Number of Corporations
274
1,798
1,302
222
1,283
238
292
1,813
1,910
1,328
265
317
278
352
1,911
1,301
348
1,988
1,362
278
1,397
276
368
2,041
2,112
1,461
270
381
287
408
2,210
1,515
2,320
1,578
284
458
1,655
297
501
2,453
2,437
1,624
284
529
Total Assets of Corporations
(millions of dollars)
$26,879
$16,650
$131,862
1958 ................
$219,180
$43,809
$175,371
230,830
45,007
185,823
27,263
16,761
141,799
1959 ................
18,851
155,649
1960 ................
248,081
45,306
202,775
28,275
47,541
210,173
27,633
19,709
162,831
1961................
257,714
29,058
19,905
176,138
1962 ................
274,852
49,731
225,101
289,795
53,151
236,644
29,857
19,627
187,160
1963 ................
19,450
200,870
1964 ................
305,587
53,735
251,852
31,532
56,613
273,480
32,952
20,549
219,979
1965 ................
330,093
61,725
307,310
34,883
20,602
251,825
1966 ................
369,035
36,330
21,455
286,456
1967 ................
409,457
65,236
344,221
383,887
56,264
20,817
326,806
1968 ................
448,897
65,010
Note: Numbers of corporations are those shown for the 100 percent segment of
the FTC-SEC sample. Similar figures cannot be derived for the size-classes for which
the sample is less than 100 percent.
FTC-SEC, SouRcEs: QUARTERLY FINANCIAL REPORT FOR MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS
(1958), Number of corporations in 100 percent sample, fourth quarter report, 1958 at 2,
and total assets of corporations in 100 percent sample, first quarter report, 1959, Table IX;
for 1959-1968, fourth quarter report, Table XI for 1959-1961 and Table X for 1962-1968.
1958 ................
1959 ................
1960 ................
1961 ................
1962 ................
1963 ................
1964 ................
1965 ................
1966 ................
1967 ................
1968 ................

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

included or excluded? Are data on domestic corporations which are subsidiaries or affiliates of foreign corporations included or excluded?
Are joint ventures included individually or not?
Are acquired and divested assets valued by comparable methods by
different companies?
Are the assets figures of different corporations affected differently by
their ways of handling depreciation, tax anticipations, long-term payments
for major capital investments, their methods of consolidating data on subsidiaries, etc.?
For the denominator, or the all-manufacturing figure, there are some
additional and some overlapping questions. For example, does the universe
cover corporations only or does it cover other forms of business organiza-

ANTITRUST ISSUES

tion as well? Is the universe based on a sample or a total survey (and if a
sample, how is it made up)? What is the response rate for the survey? How
are manufacturing companies distinguished from other companies? Are the
nonmanufacturing operations of manufacturing companies included or
excluded? Are nonregistered as well as registered companies included? How
are foreign holdings of domestic companies handled? How are domestic
holdings of foreign companies handled? How and when are data for newly
formed or newly acquired companies introduced into totals? And are data
for different companies fully comparable?
(b) Second, are the companies whose assets are included in the
numerator the same in each year or do findings on changes in aggregate
concentration focus on different sets of companies such as those who are
the 200 largest in each year? Are biases introduced by changes in activities
included in the data, but not properly classifiable in the categories covered?
And what provisions have been made to assure that companies newly
classifiable in manufacturing (or dropping out) will be included (or excluded)?
Obviously the answers to the first two sets of questions will be
significantly affected by the type of corporate activity measured, e.g., total
assets, total sales, profits before or after taxes, etc., as well as by the technical
data input for the numerator and the denominator of the ratio.
(c) Third, given the makeup of specific ratios, what are their implications for public policy? For example, would policy conclusions be different
if the manufacturing sector of the economy were expanding or were
shrinking compared with other sectors, 44 or again, would policy conclusions
be different if the largest companies were in general those operating in the
fastest-growing industries or were those operating in industries that were
growing at a slower pace? 45
We are, therefore, faced with questions concerning exactly what it is we
want to encourage or discourage if we adopt a merger policy based on
aggregate concentration data.
It should also be noted that even if we have resolved all such questions,
there still remain questions concerning the relevance of particular items
that might be included or excluded from the numerator and the denominator
of the aggregate concentration fraction and their effect on the observed
level and observed changes in the level of the ratio. Even if, for example,
comparable data are fed into both the numerator and the denominator of
the fraction, the implications of the results will differ with the relevance of
the items to the problem under consideration. If, for example, the foreign
assets of the 200 largest manufacturing corporations should not be included
44

Corporate manufacturing assets as a percent of total corporate assets for all indus-

tries declined from 23.2 percent in 1948 to 21.9 percent in 1966.
VICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY,

STATISTICS

OF INCOME, CORPORATION

INTERNAL REVENUE SER-

INCOME TAX RETURNS

(1948 & 1966).
45 See Whitney, Mergers, Conglomerates and Oligopolies: A Widening of Antitrust
Targets, 21 RurrcEas L. REv. 187 (1967).
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in an analysis of aggregate domestic concentration, the inclusion of such
figures even if fed into both the numerator and the denominator will raise
the ratio.4 6 And if the 200 largest corporations as a group are expanding
their foreign operations more rapidly than those below the 200 largest,
this will, in itself, cause an increase in observed aggregate concentration,
since the base of the fraction does not expand to include all assets of all
domestic and foreign manufacturing corporations. Or if the 200 largest are
moving into nonmanufacturing operations at a faster rate than other
manufacturing corporations, this will also cause an increase in observed
aggregate concentration in manufacturing.
Or consider the effects on observed changes in aggregate concentration
of changes in the availability of "large" company data. If, for example, any
appreciable number of "large" nonregistered companies go public during
the period under consideration and are included in the numerator of the
aggregate concentration fraction for a later but not for an earlier year, their
inclusion would artificially inflate the observed change in aggregate concentration.
Or, as a third example, consider how the level and pace of change in
the level of observed aggregate concentration will shift depending upon
whether one considers the shares held in earlier years by the companies
that were the largest in a later year or whether one considers the shares held
in each year by the companies ranking largest in that year.
In the Northwest (Goodrich) merger complaint, for example, the proportion of the total assets of manufacturing corporations said to be held
by the 200 largest firms was 48.1 percent in 1948, 54.2 percent in 1960, and
58.7 percent in 1967. These figures work out to an annual average rate of
increase of 0.51 percentage points for the 1948-1960 period and 0.64 percentage points for the 1960-1967 period - or an increase in the average
annual rate of increase in aggregate concentration for the later period. In
the United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp.4 7 (Grinnell) complaint,
by contrast, the proportion of the total assets of manufacturing corporations
said to be held by the 200 largest firms was 48.1 percent in 1948, 55.8 percent
in 1960, and 60.1 percent in 1968. These figures work out to an average
annual rate of increase of 0.64 percentage points per year for the earlier
period and 0.54 percentage points for the later period-or a decrease in the
average annual rate of increase in aggregate concentration for the later
period. (See Table IV).
In the absence of further specification of the data, we cannot be certain
what has happened. But examination of the price stability study from which
46 Start, for example, with the fraction 1; add one to both the numerator and the
denominator to get 2/. Since 1/2 represents a ratio of 50 percent, and 2/3 a ratio of
662/ percent, the addition of "one"- if unjustified -raises the ratio in an unjustifiable
fashion, even if it is consistently fed into both the numerator and denominator of the
fraction.
47 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969).

715

ANTITRUST ISSUES
TABLE IV

SHARE OF TOTAL ASSETS OF MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS HELD BY THE 200 LARGEST FIRMS
AS SHOWN IN DIFFERENT SOURCES*

Per Cent of Total Assets
Average Annual
of Manufacturing Corporations
Percentage-Point Increase
Accounted for by the
194819601960200 Largest Firms
1948

1960

1967

1968

1960

1967

1968

Committee on Price Stability Study
48.1
Version 1 ...................
48.1
Version 2 ...................

54.2
55.8

58.7
58.7

-

0.51
0.64

0.64
0.41

-

54.2

58.7

-

0.51

0.64

-

60.1

0.64

-

Source

Department of Justice Complaints
LTV (J&L Steel), 4-14-69 )
4
ITT (Canteen), 4-28-69
.
48.1
Northwest (Goodrich),
)
5-1-69
48.1
ITT (Grinnell), 8-1-69 ......

55.8

-

0.54

* This table is designed to show that the observed share of the total assets of all
manufacturing corporations accounted for by the 200 "largest" corporations varies with
the method of identifying these companies and with the source used. The observed share
of the 200 largest for any given year will, for example, differ depending upon whether
one is examining the share of the specific companies who were the 200 largest in terms
of assets in that year or the share in that year held by the companies who were the 200
largest in terms of assets in some other year.
Since neither the price stability study nor the complaints specify what companies are
included in the "200 largest" figures, it is not possible to be certain why the various
versions differ. It appears possible, however, that the 54.2 percent figure for 1960 represents the share of total 1960 assets held by the 200 firms which had the largest assets in
1967 and the 55.8 percent figure for 1960 represents the share of total 1960 assets held
by the 200 firms which had the largest assets in 1960-a different set of companies.
If there was any turnover among the 200 largest between 1960 and 1967, a figure for
1960 computed by the first method will yield a greater apparent rate of change in aggregate concentration between 1960 and 1967 than will a figure for 1960 computed by the
second method-as the table shows.
SOURCES: STAFF OF COMM. ON PRICE STABILITY, CABINET, STUDIES 79, 92 (1969); Dep't of
Justice Complaints.

the figures appear to come 48 suggests that the 54.2 percent aggregate concentration figure for 1960 alleged in Northwest (Goodrich) may represent
the share of 1960 assets held by the companies identified as the 200 largest
in 1967, while the 55.8 percent figure alleged in ITT (Grinnell) may
represent the share of 1960 assets held by the companies identified as the
200 largest in 1960 - a different set of companies. But regardless of whether
this explanation is correct, it is apparent that observed aggregate concentration and observed rates of change will be affected by the year for
which the 200 largest companies are identified as well as by the range of
other factors suggested above.
Indeed, the longer the time span, the greater the movement of the
largest companies beyond the sector under study, and the greater the
48 STUDIES,

supra note 42.
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turnover among the largest companies, the larger will be the distortion in
the observed change in aggregate concentration, if one focuses solely on the
companies that are the largest at the end of the period under examination.
Some Statistical Notes
The above considerations suggest several tentative generalizations:
First, large-scale acquisitions in manufacturing and mining do not
appear to be decimating the corporate population as a whole or any
size-class for which data are available. While existing figures are not
definitive, there is no present evidence that more appropriate data would
lead to significantly different results.
Second, the concept of aggregate concentration and the data appropriate
for measuring it both present serious problems. These problems are compounded when one seeks to measure changes in aggregate concentration
over time. Indeed, the problem of matching company operations to
appropriate universes will be difficult to resolve in the face of the growing
complexity of interindustry as well as intercompany activities. If we wish to
find some global figure for a company which in some way measures its
resources, question at once arises as to whether such a figure should then be
compared with universe data covering a more limited range of resources.
Third, while problems of measuring the level of aggregate concentration
and changes in the level over time are plainly difficult, still greater technical
difficulties are encountered when one seeks to determine with precision the
contribution of mergers to changes in aggregate concentration. Here, for
example, one must ask what would have happened to the funds invested in
acquisitions if specific acquisitions had not been made and what would have
been the history of the "large" companies that were acquired if they had
had to continue on their own?
THE TRAJECTORY

As of late 1968, the development of merger law had moved beyond the
direct potential competitive effects of horizontal and vertical mergers to
encompass the effects of mergers between companies making related
products. But these relationships were much more like those in previous cases
than their initial novelty suggested.
Rules for dear-cut horizontal and vertical mergers were grounded on
facts concerning the markets of suppliers, competitors, or customers of
the acquired company and on facts concerning the market shares of the
merging companies and the degree of concentration in the relevant markets.
Implicit in these rules, however, were assumptions that the boundaries
of the relevant markets are fixed and that neither entry by additional
companies nor erosion of the market boundaries by newer products or newer
technologies would be likely to dilute concentration or the market share
of the company under attack.
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Rules for convergent conglomerate mergers - or mergers of companies
making complementary or reciprocally related products -were as of the
end of 1968 almost as firmly grounded in facts concerning market shares,
concentration, and a close connection between markets that could be jointly
worked by the combining partners. Clayton 7 conclusions concerning such
mergers rested on facts concerning the ways in which the acquired company
- with the backing of the acquiring company - could grow at the expense
of rivals lacking such backing. Although the markets of the merging
companies were not so simply related as in the older cases, the relations
were still plain and in being - and although findings were phrased in
potentiality language, they were based on facts that showed direct linkages
between the market of the acquired company and the expanding operations
of the company acquiring it. Implicit in the Supreme Court's decisions in
these cases were assumptions concerning fixed market boundaries and the
power of a "rich parent" to support a relatively strong acquired company
that had been operating in a small-company market. The market boundary
assumptions were, however, different in form from those in the horizontal
and vertical cases - since they provided for an opening of the boundaries
sufficient to permit penetration by the acquiring company but not sufficient
to admit other companies or other products.
The force of these assumptions concerning market boundaries depends
on the fact that without them figures on market shares and concentration
have no meaning.
And so we come to the new thrust against divergent conglomerate
mergers - where there are relatively few economic linkages among the
markets of the merging partners. Here - leaving to one side acquisitions
generated primarily by stock market leverage or long-term investment
considerations - are the mergers where the acquiring company believes it
can support the resources of the acquired company in ways that will make
the company a more active and rewarding competitor in the company's
own markets and potential markets.
Implications and Alternatives
The outward thrust of merger act theory beyond convergent into
divergent conglomerate acquisitions raises the question of whether a general
theory on conglomerate comparable to current theory on horizontal and
vertical acquisitions is in process of formulation.
If the allegations concerning aggregate concentration in the 1969
complaints were to become law, they would create such a theory, since they
would cover not only significant convergent and divergent conglomerate
acquisitions but major horizontal and vertical acquisitions by the largest
companies in the economy as well.
If, however, such a conglomerate theory does not take shape, the current
progress of decisions affecting convergent conglomerate acquisitions will in
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time pick up acquisitions affecting markets in ways comparable to those
suggested in Brown Shoe, United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,49
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,50 United States v. Continental
Can Co.,51 Procter & Gamble, and Consolidated Foods. The theory will not,
however, necessarily pick up convergent conglomerate acquisitions in markets
where technological change is making market boundaries obsolete or where
high market shares and concentration are the temporary result of true
innovation 52 or its obverse - approaching senility,53 nor will it necessarily
pick up divergent conglomerate acquisitions where an unrelated aggressive
company acquries a modest-sized or smaller company in a market that would
benefit from new competition.
If, however, the new complaints are upheld, the courts will be able to
move directly from evidence that an acquiring or acquired company is one
of the 200 largest and has, in fact, entered a new market by way of acquisition
to a conclusion that potential competition has been eliminated; from
evidence of an abstract vertical relation between the product lines of the
merging companies to conclusions concerning potential reciprocity effects;
and from statistics concerning aggregate concentration in manufacturing
as a whole to conclusions concerning a substantial lessening of competition
in a "line of commerce."
If such a theory should become the new criterion for evaluating a threat
to competition, the market structuralism of the pre-1969 decisions would
become super-structuralism, since the pre-1969 focus on market definitions
and market structure would simply be enlarged to include wider segments
of the economy. The meticulous pre-1969 type of evidence of close economic
ties between the acquiring and acquired companies would be displaced
by a more tenuous set of inferences concerning potential competition and
potential reciprocity resting on a broad theory that the larger and more
diversified the company, the more markets it can enter and the more opportunities for reciprocity will be open to it.
Any attempt to replace current theories of market structuralism with a
theory of super-structuralism would, however, have to face the same
ambiguities as earlier theory which failed to distinguish between relatively
stable markets where structural tests are most relevant and dynamic markets
where they are less relevant. If, however, such a theory of super-structuralism
does not become law, we would, in effect, be acknowledging that scalar
changes in economic complexity require something more than an abstract
extension of earlier theory-and would be holding that such changes require
49376 U.S. 651 (1964).
50377 U.S. 271 (1964).
51 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
52 See, e.g., United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 5 TPADE REG. REP. (1961 Trade
Cas.)
70,160 (D. Tex. 1961).
53 United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 321
F.2d 534 (9th Cir.), application denied, 84 S. Ct. 4 (Goldberg, Circuit Justice, 1965).
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a feedback theory that will permit competitive policy to follow moving
targets in an open-end economy.
Tracking a Moving Target
As market boundaries break down with the development of new patterns
of supply and use4 and as new technologies develop to meet new needs,
new theories of competition of the type appropriate for tracking a moving
target might well be developed. How such a theory would differ from a
theory appropriate for a more static economy can only be suggested.
If one works up through known theory toward an unknown, it is plain
that in an atomistic economy no antitrust policy would be necessary. In a
nonatomistic but relatively stable or slowly changing economy, antitrust
policy can be, and is, designed to preserve market balance through enforcement programs designed to compensate for excessive market controls, undue
restraint of trade, or excessively destructive competitive techniques. Such a
policy can channel company growth into new areas and moderate forms of
hypercompetition that threaten to destroy competition itself. In such an
economy, appropriate antitrust policy will, therefore, aid in motivating
companies to modify anticompetitive behavior in ways that benefit economic
growth.
In a complex and rapidly changing economy, antitrust policy based on
a theory of super-structuralism combined with assumptions appropriate for
stable or slowly changing markets may create damaging wobble-effects. If,
for example, the resources used in making acquisitions during recent years
had gone into internal growth, question arises as to whether the total
demand would not have put strains on scarce resources while leaving lacunae
in areas where new technical and product approaches to today's problems
need to be developed. Meanwhile, if the medium-size and larger companies
seeking to be acquired would have had to find buyers smaller and less significant than themselves, they would have faced a different and harsher set
54 The rate of breakdown of existing boundaries is indicated by the degree to which
the Census Bureau finds it necessary to realign its SIC categories.
The 1954 Census of Manufactures, for example, listed 455 industries; the 1958 Census
of Manufactures, 430 industries. Furthermore, a relatively large number of individual
industry definitions were changed to allow for new or growing industries as separate
classifications or to eliminate industries considered economically insignificant.
Of the 455 industries in the 1954 Census, 235 retained the same definition in the 1958
Census; the code for 46 of these industries was, however, changed. A shift in definition
occurred for 48 industries, which retained the same code in both Census years, but parts
of other industries were transferred to them. A change in definition and a change in code
were experienced by 76 industries; these industries were merged with other industries, or
parts of other industries were added to them; about 25 of the 76 industries were eliminated as separate classifications and merged into "not elsewhere classified" groups. The
remaining 96 industries were split into two or more parts. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T COMMERCE,

HISTORICAL COMPARABILITY

OF CENSUS

OF MANUFACTURERS

1929-1958, at 7 (Bureau of the Census Working Paper No. 9, 1959).
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of alternatives: they could have found a small or, by antitrust standards,
neutral acquirer, invited in inexperienced management, or liquidated.
Or to put the matter differently, tests of competitive effects that depend
on such factors as size of company, market shares, concentration, and
barriers to entry were developed primarily to fit a market theory that
posited stable market boundaries with demand growing roughly in proportion to population, supplied by small single-product firms moving into
attractive and out of unattractive markets instantaneously. And tests that
depend on essentially the same factors for manufacturing as a whole have
now been posited to fit larger but still ultimately fixed sector boundaries as
if the economy were so stable that simple rules would yield appropriate
policy results.
In today's economy a major company is, however, not a simple unit,
but a complex of domestic and foreign subsidiaries, joint ventures, and
affiliates, linked to a range of other companies though subcontracting,
licensing, or long-term supply or purchase contracts. In short, companies
are not atomistic units dealing with other atomistic units.
Meanwhile, the older simplified concept of an industry or a market is
also changing so that for many markets one can no longer think of sets
of producers of closely related sets of products who confront each other and
only each other wherever they buy or sell. Instead, one finds sets of
operations by multifaceted companies transacting business in different areas
in order to meet expanding industrial and consumer requirements. And these
operations are fed by a flow of interrelated resources that are continuously
transformed through the product and service systems of varying sets of
companies. If this delineation of the current economic process is correct,
economic analysis of what used to be called industrial organization will
translate into analysis of industrial process.
Classical economic theory points to the desirability of large numbers
of companies, small market shares, and ease of entry into an exit from a
market where all other conditions are equal. In such a world, the composition and boundaries of markets are given, as are conditions of entry
and exit, so that the concept of "structure" has a clear and definite meaning.
In such a world, conclusions concerning competition and, therefore, concerning antitrust policy follow directly from data concerning market
structure.
But where other conditions are not equal and new technologies are
forcing the development of new market systems and new intercompany
relations, "market" structure becomes a less reliable index of competitive
behavior. Under such conditions, application of market share or even
aggregate concentration tests can erroneously give anticompetitive answers
to critical questions. Indeed, it may be appropriate to ask whether, in
identifying "large" conglomerate acquisition with aggregate concentration and aggregate concentration with a substantial lessening of competition
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and a tendency to monopoly - we may be resolving issues concerning new
growth against new forms and methods of competition.
Conglomerate Acquisitions in an Open-End Economy
Granted an increasing population, a multiplying need-base, and rapidly
changing technologies of production, distribution, and use, what questions
are relevant to antitrust policy on conglomerate acquisitions? The critical
questions would perhaps be: first, what is desirable and undesirable company
"growth" in a growing economy, and second, what mix of incentives and
constraints on company flexibility is appropriate to the range of national
goals - including, but not limited to, the goal of competition.
Leaving to one side, as outside the range of this study, acquisitions
powered by stock market leverage considerations, it will, within the next
decade, be necessary for those concerned with public policy on competition to
decide whether we want to move beyond existing antitrust tests for convergent conglomerate acquisitions and develop supermarket theory for
divergent conglomerate acquisitions. Our methods of resolving this puzzle
will determine the environmental future of the economy, for wherever the
economy is changing rapidly, highly structuralized tests - whether of concentration or super-concentration - may give anticompetitive results. This
will be particularly true wherever national goals are generating new and
exploding needs, e.g., urban renewal needs, needs for pollution controls,
provisions for growing leisure time, etc.
The major companies now seeking to meet these needs are, of necessity,
crossing market boundaries and are, therefore, increasing their antitrust
liabilities, under an aggregate concentration theory of vulnerability, as they
become potential competitors or potentially reciprocally related in wider
and wider ranges of markets.
In today's world, maximization of national and of individual choice at
lowest cost will not necessarily be served by a deconglomeratization policy
based on a theory of super-structuralism. Indeed, we may be driven to accept
the fact that, as in planning-programming-budgeting analysis (PPB), priorities among goals and choices of efficient systems for meeting these goals may
be appropriate modes of competitive analysis. 55 Competing systems for
meeting wants, not the gross size of a company or the range of markets it
serves, might then be the focus of competitive policy.
Finally, there would appear to be need for a painstaking review of
whether essentially static theory - whether based on market or supermarket concentration - is appropriate to the antitrust problems of dynamic
areas of the economy. As major companies increasingly apply systems analysis
to their own long-range planning and seek to think in terms of broadly
55 See J. WErON, CONGLOMERATE FIRMS AND BUSINESS DIVERSIFICATION (1969); Jacoby,
The Conglomerate Corporation,THE CENTER MAGAZINE, July 1969, at 40; Rubel, Systems
Management and Industry Behavior, in PUBLIC POLICY TowARD MERGERS 208 (J. Weston
& S. Peltzman eds. 1969).
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defined needs and alternative methods of meeting them, there appears to be
a parallel need to ask whether antitrust policy that does not take a similar
approach will not in the end choke off emerging forms of competition. Our
ability to correct our own course where necessary to adjust our enforcement trajectory to a moving target will determine the quality of our
economic environment. The corrections may be small or large, but they
should, it is suggested, be designed in terms of criteria for enhancing
competition among major systems for supplying changing national needs
and - within these systems - for maximum flexibility in the range of sizes
of companies and the range of competitive choices open to them.

